[as a result of benedict seraphim’s excellent summarization of the limits of reason (posted previously)the first two sections of this post have become somewhat redundant – or, more optimistically, have become a more extensive look at the proofs. the relatively novel ideas of these entries start in sections iii and iv]
in george orwell’s 1984, the concept of ‘doublethink’ is introduced:
“his mind slid away into the labyrinthine world of doublethink. to know
and not to know, to be conscious of complete truthfulness while telling
carefully constructed lies, to hold simultaneously two opinions which
cancelled out, knowing them to be contradictory and believing in both of
them, to use logic against logic, to repudiate morality while laying
claim to it, to believe the democracy was impossible and that the party
was the guardian of democracy, to forget whatever it was necessary to
forget, then to draw it back into memory again at the moment when it was
needed, and then promptly to forget it again: and above all, to apply
the same process to the process itself. that was the ultimate subtlety:
consciously to induce unconsciousness, and then, once again, to be
unconscious of the act of hypnosis you had just performed. even to
understand the word ‘doublethink’ involved the use of doublethink”.
in these entries i hope to reveal the inherent fallibility of reason-based interpretations of truth, and reframe the concept of ‘meaning’ in lieu of this refutation, so as to acknowledge the human capacity to engage in ‘doublethink’, and encourage active use of its therapeutic potentialities. thus, this is a debate between pluralistic and absolute concepts of truth as much as it is a debate between the authorities of faith and reason.
ok.
my position is an anti-position, it is a radical skepticism that poses its argument from within the vacuum of uncertainty left when all claims of superior authority are intrinsically proven to be untenable. more to the point: i believe there are no verifiable absolutes, and due to this limitation to human cognitive abilities all interpretations of the world are equally flawed in foundation, and therefore equally valid. i include all conceptual knowledge within this limitation, sparing no single theory, not even this very theory i am proposing now. therefore what i am proposing is anti-dogmatic, and like i said, less a position than it is an anti-position, or a retreat into void without concrete truth. the legitimacy of this position lies in the fact that it is rationally indisputable, it is self-coherent and abides by the same rules of logic to derive its conclusions as every other rational position, and escapes the final scrutiny of origins, which, i argue, proves every other position to be intrinsically untenable.
since solipsism is generally perceived by the proper sciences as a reprehensible position for a philosophy to be based on, i may play devil’s advocate and take up defense of it, to prove my point.
solipsism is defined as:
1.the theory that the self is the only thing that can be known and verified.
2.the theory or view that the self is the only reality.
it is not necessary for me to prove the validity of solipsism for it to be valid, because internally the position is sound (it embraces plurality)… rather it is up to rational opposition to disprove it since the legitimacy of the superior authority of hierarchal knowledge (implicit in reason-based arguments) is directly challenged by solipsism’s claim to truth. in all my reading i have not come across a single credible argument against solipsism. david deutsch and karl popper challenged solipsism but they ended up discrediting it on its social benefit (presupposing a fixed hierarchy of values) but conveniently choose to forego mentioning this does not negate the individual value, nor negates the position’s claim of superior authority. solipsism is all too often pushed aside and ignored, deemed a sophist trick, but based on irrational impulses. this undermines every single reason-based argument which derives its authority on its rational integrity. quantum physics is fundamentally no more valid an interpretation of reality than solipsism.
of course none of this is new, i didn’t discover this, there is an entire intellectual movement that has relentlessly dismantled the meta-narrative of universal truths. but this is largely an esoteric development, something intellectuals concede to knowing; the masses, on the other hand, are still largely susceptible to the positivist enthusiasm of universal truths handed down since the enlightenment. the average person would still believe that quantum physics is a superior interpretation of the world than a theory like solipsism which argues that all conceptual knowledge is a fabrication of an individual mind, and that atoms exist because the individual mind wills it to exist. therefore, i believe it is still a valid question, a crucial question, and without resolving it, all rationalists (whether in theory or practice) must concede that their knowledge is disingenuous, and dependent solely on belief.
the lack of verifiable truth in all interpretations supports the dualist conceptualization of reality that immanuel kant proposed, wherein the realm of the ‘thing-in-itself’ is epistemologically distinct from the realm of all human interpretations of the thing. as a precautionary measure kant insists that our phenomenological condition prevents us from knowing anything concretely about the ‘thing-in-itself’, and isolates it from all interpretations, which he sees as bound up in the phenomena, or impression, of the ‘thing-in-itself’ that is received through our senses. kant includes concepts such as space, time and causality within the sphere of our phenomenological experience of reality, so that nothing may be ascertained about the ‘thing-in-itself’.
there is belief, and the process of believing (though this is presupposed in metaphysical concepts, and may only be itself, a direct belief). when reason-based arguments have no basis of authority, due to their inability to reconcile intrinsic inconsistencies, all that is left is faith-based arguments, which do not need to reconcile themselves to a higher authority, but are quintessentially self-perpetuating, self-authenticating.
ii.
my philosophy (which is yet nameless, nor owned by me) has two chief parts, and so far in this ‘doublethink’ sequence of entries i have been focused on only the first. again, i am presently lacking snappy titles to things, but tentatively these parts may be called
part 1 – dismantling meaning
part 2 – restructuring meaning
i bring this up with hume still in mind, and his infuriating argument that radical skepticism is unsound because one cannot exist dogmatically as such. in defense of radical skepticism i say it is a means to an end, and was never supposed to be habitable. it is a tool in order to dismantle all interpretations of truth that are not internally coherent. it merely paves the way for a new, habitable philosophy, yet to be discussed (part 2).
now in continuation of part 1:
my hypothesis is all reason-based interpretations of truth are fallible, in that they depend upon an initial leap of faith to substantiate their claims. faith and reason are irreconcilable faculties of evaluation, which value opposing kinds of proof to derive their conclusions. they are irreconcilable but not equal: whereas faith has the potential to be self-authenticating (i.e. within the sensation of instantaneous conviction) reason is dependent on a logical articulation of its authority before it can be authenticated. therefore, it is possible to challenge the authority of reason by applying rational inquiry to its articulated laws.
reason is unsound because it bases its authority on laws that have no immediate rational justification, rather they depend on a retroactive verification process. now, that is a loaded sentence, so i am going to need some time here to fully explain this. for the faculty of reason to operate there needs to be, among other things, the condition of time (since reason needs to rationally articulate in order to authenticate, and rational articulation directly implies sequential activity, time is therefore essential). due to this temporal quality to the process of reasoning a claim is initially posed and then later on in the sequence of reasoning a rational defense may be articulated – thus there is a temporal disparity between hypothesis and the articulation (or awareness) of proof. in other words, there is a gap. there is a gap between my original proposition and the defense i am attempting to make now, so i use this very paragraph as an example. characteristically, then, one could say this temporal disparity is a condition of all reasoning. these gaps do little damage to the integrity of reason within the ordained confines of reasons’ pre-established laws, however it is altogether different when gaps are examined in the laws themselves.
i will not specify the laws, because it is so easy to be bogged down by the details of what qualifies and lose the point entirely. suffice it to say there are consistent ideals within rational discourse that are universally held by rationalists to be indisputable and serve as a means of discriminating true from false. now, where did these laws come from, and how were they validated? there are two main strands of thought regarding their origin:
1. the laws themselves are ‘conditions of knowledge’ that exist a priori human experience, in order to make experience rational or possible
2. the laws developed dialectically, through the accumulative knowledge of human experience, and each has been refined to an indisputable state.
the first strand of thought is synonymous with kantian philosophy, in fact i swiped his terminology ‘conditions of knowledge’, though i presently forget exactly what he classified as conditions. nonetheless this validation of the foundational laws of reason does not seem very rational at all: to know something that is beyond human experience is to rely on faith, more so than reason. the desire to inverse the sequence, by supposing a pre-existing reality prior to not only the most immediate inquiry, but to all of lived experience, is extremely presumptuous to say the least. and yet it is presumed, through inductive reasoning. the budding rationalist says “yes of course, these laws exists a priori human experience because the integrity of these laws need to be beyond speculation in order for the content of rational discourse to have any absolute credence, and since so much of rational discourse demonstrates a nearly inexhaustible synchronicity with the natural world via scientific manipulation there must be indisputable proof of reason’s integrity”. there are several problems with using induction to verify these pre-existing conditions: first, it is circular, because you are using inductive reasoning (which is itself arguably a law) to verify rationally its own legitimacy; the second problem is sequential: to presuppose a general principle such as that there must be indisputable proof of reason’s integrity without first possessing laws to authenticate, requires a retroactive verification process, and therefore, the foundational laws of reason originate in a leap of faith. the retroactive verification is subsequently made void by its temporal situation coming after and dependent on a claim that is solely validated by faith. one may infer this not only due to the sequence disparity of the claim but also because, as mentioned above, reason and faith are irreconcilable, and on that demerit the verification process similarly fails.
as for the second strand of thought with regards to the origins and means of validating rational laws, there is the idea that the integrity of the laws depends on their wherewithal through history, and their ultimate refinement via accumulative knowledge. they are validated by their utility with regards to, in particular, the fields of science and mathematics. however, in this strand there are no overriding claims of their absolute authority outside the realms of reason-based inquiries. the laws are tools for practical ends, without conceit of absolute significance. therefore this argument is not in conflict with my original thesis, as it is not an interpretation of truth, in an absolute sense.
now there may be accusations that i made all of these arguments using rational laws and i am just as culpable of bad reasoning in negating them as those who endorse them… however i was merely outlining plausible answers to how the laws are validated, it makes no different if my arguments are accused of relying on faulty reasoning (my argument is that all inferences into the validity of rational laws will concede to faulty reasoning). it is up to my opposition, the puritanical rationalist to prove on rational grounds the integrity and validity of those laws he/she uses to discriminate true from false. it is this, i believe is impossible, and it is this that becomes the fissure to all rational integrity.
iii.
my two main arguments against the legitimacy of reason-based interpretations of truth have been:
1. the lack of a cohesive, intelligent argument against the claim that solipsism is a superior interpretation of truth (solipsism being defined as the belief that only i myself and my own experiences are real, while anything else—a physical object or another person—is nothing more than an object of my [totality in psychology of sensations, perceptions, ideas, attitudes, and feelings of which i am aware at any given time or within a given time span]). to reiterate once more, solipsism is authenticated through belief, and in and of itself does not need to be rationally coherent… however the integrity of all reason-based interpretations of truth depend on the ability to rationally disprove solipsism’s claim to authority, because its very plausibility and undisputed nature supplants the foundation of reason and makes all reason-based claims baseless. it is thus not imperative for solipsism to ‘prove’ itself in rational terms, but imperative for reason-based interpretations of truth to disprove solipsism by their own standards of evaluation. that i have discovered no credible argument thus far to achieve this proves tentatively that all reason-based interpretations of truth are fundamentally baseless.
2. all reason-based interpretations of truth are fallible due to the ‘untouchable’ authority foundational axioms are allotted, by faith alone. when the same scrutiny of reason is applied to the foundational axioms of reason as is applied to all other matters of discussion it would be shown that they are internally unsound and inconsistent with what they authorize.
were this not enough to prove my point i have a third and final damnable argument to make, which segues nicely into the ‘restructuring meaning’ part of my point.
reason-based interpretations of truth demand a certain rigor, or consistency, so that the accumulated proofs conform to certain laws allotted by the foundational axioms. for example, with most of the sciences there is an overriding desire to deemphasize the passions of the individual scientist so as to preserve the objective integrity of the findings. it is a discipline that is characteristically inhibiting of the natural human condition, out of an altruistic desire to be objective. in other words, there is a filter added in the process of science, so that what is concluded is in some respects more representative of the axiomatic parameters of the discipline, and proportionally less representative of the unfiltered human condition. and there is similarly always a rift between ‘theory’ and ‘practice’, and ‘ideology’ and ‘the people’. one need only look at a roman catholic christian who behaves outside the tenets of the orthodox faith, or of the geneticist who strives to clone a human embryo (as a purely material manipulation) yet in his most intimate thoughts has belief in the human soul.
the axiomatic parameters of a theory, of a law, of even a single belief, are never adequately representative of the natural human condition, in that they endorse a rigid consistency that the being in flux, in his/her existential state are realistically incapable of upholding for any length of time. this indictment i am making goes well beyond challenging only reason-based interpretations of truth, to include, as i mentioned, beliefs that endorse singular devotion. the crux of this indictment is that they are not adequately representative of the natural human condition, nor are they realistically possible in any rigid sense. ‘theory’ and ‘ideology’ are not habitable, and yet reason-based interpretations of truth attempt to insist just that, that a theory may speak of the reality we reside in, and inform our behaviour, our self-identity, and that these things are indisputable… yet the individual residing in this bubble will himself never sustain the ‘theory’ or ‘ideology’ in any consistent sense, and through the whims of ‘practice’ entertain all sorts of ideas with the potential to negate the axiomatic parameters of the bubble. from a ‘theory’ perspective, the individual is delusional in these subversions from the one reality, and are appropriated within the larger theory as such… but which has the greater authority, the ‘theory’ or the agent of the ‘theory’, that is to say, human beings.
two choices are set before the individual, and on rational terms it is obvious which are most attuned to his/her behaviour:
1) one can be consistent to a view that promotes inconsistency as characteristic of the human decision-making process.
2) one can be inconsistent to a view that promotes consistency as characteristic of the human decision-making process.
in this way, not only are the origins of reason-based interpretations unfounded, not only does it lack credible proof to disprove its opposition, but also, throughout its history, as enacted by human beings, the agents of the very axioms devised, there is a significant rift between theory and practice, that is not representative of people.
iv.
restructuring meaning:
i am of the belief that it is easier to destroy than create; similarly, in philosophic debates it is easier to dismantle a supposed truth than it is to propose and defend one. my previous entries on this topic have brought me to a ground zero point where now the opportunity to construct a viable philosophy is granted. from this point on i will tread delicately so as to avoid unnecessary misinterpretations of my proposed philosophy.
up until this point i have shown that reason-based interpretations of truth are fallible, and therefore false. in the above-mentioned assertion i define ‘truth’ as a knowable universal property of reality; this is a crucial distinction. i am not denouncing all reason based interpretations of reality, nor denouncing the use of reason en masse, but rather i am denouncing a select kind of interpretation, one that claims to ‘know’ something as universally, objectively, absolutely true. it is essential to assert this before i begin my own rational defense for ‘doublethink’, so that one does not misconstrue a contradiction in my use of reason forthwith. the only contradiction that can arise from my use of reason in my argument is if my argument claims universal implications, which it will not.
i would also like to reiterate that i have not discredited the possibility of universal, objective, absolute truths; just that they may never be credibly verified, and therefore ‘known’ in a rational way. i do however maintain a hopeful optimism that universal truths may be known irrationally, and by that i mean through some means of verification other than reason can supply, i.e. via faith.
so skeptics take note: if in my proposed philosophy i make any claims to ‘knowable’ and ‘universal’ properties of reality (both qualities in tandem) i will be subject to the same error i vilified in my last entries, and will have to return to ground zero, or revise. for example, if i say: everyone wants to be loved. this is indefensible by rational standards, and if i base a part of my theory on it, i must concede failure. it is a universal claim, and it implies that i know it, that one can know that everyone wants to be loved. this is unacceptable in a rational argument (but i could ‘believe’ it to be true, and via faith ‘know’ it, but i would have to make that distinction clear, and not let any of my irrational beliefs intercede in my attempt to rationally argue the viability of my theory).
…this leads me to mention that i will be using reason as a means of discerning but not as a means of authenticating my philosophy; again, a crucial distinction. i will be conducting a thought experiment: within the confines of the experiment i will use reason puritanically as a means of articulating and discerning the potential attributes and demerits of my assertions; outside the confines of the experiment, with no required loyalty to puritanical reason, i will make a final decision that freely interprets the experiment’s conclusions. thus i will authenticate the theory on faith ultimately, in that i will believe what i decide to believe, or, put another way, i will believe according to what whim comes into my mind at the point of conviction. i believe the thought experiment is a practical tool to refine rationally certain assertions, and in that, i believe reason has utility in the conduct of my life. i believe it; i do not know it to be so, on rational grounds.
ok. deep breath.
imagine a belief in absolutes to be like a unified bed of ice on a frozen lake the boundaries of which are infinite. and imagine that the believer of absolutes is atop this bed of ice, able to move freely in any direction so long as he is certain of the absolute nature of the bed of ice he walks upon. for example, the bed of ice may be a metaphor for a devout christian’s certitude in god’s existence, or a mathematician’s certitude in the universal implications of numbers. if my prior refutations are correct, and reason-based interpretations of absolutes (truth) are fallible, and therefore false, it would so follow in this analogy that the mathematician’s bed of ice would crumble, insofar as his belief in absolutes were dependent on rational argument. he would then have two options: sink into the water or leap from ice patch to ice patch in such a way as to remain buoyant. to sink into the water is analogous to succumbing to nihilism, whereas leaping from ice patch to ice patch is analogous to actively participating in a pluralistic reality. pluralism is staying afloat in the absence of absolutes, and what i want to emphasize by this analogy is the practical impetus for pluralism, as i see it, that in order to resist succumbing to stasis and sinking, one’s mind leaps from conviction to conviction in such a way as to remain buoyant.
in my previous entry i spoke of the distinction between ‘theory’ and ‘practice’, and how in observing the trace awareness of my own thoughts, i bear witness to a mind resisting stasis, a mind which treads lightly in most of its convictions, and is able to entertain irreconcilable beliefs nearly simultaneously. the ‘practice’ of my daily thoughts seems to be able to tolerate paradoxes, contradictions, and the like without the least bit of disruption to my health. it would almost seem to me that my mind has a natural inclination towards pluralism. is it possible to will our thoughts to believe only some things and not others? is it possible to will our thoughts into stasis? in answer to the first question, i believe we can will our thoughts to believe only some things, so long as our will is naturally inclined (or through self-deception) and not coerced by an external source; but the problem with this question is it implies that the activity of willing be a constant over a considerable length of time, and this, i believe is unlikely. for example, if i feel inclined to believe that religion is the opium of the masses and that i must never engage in organized religion, i will attempt to abide by this belief for as long as my will is so inclined. the moment my will is no longer inclined to believe this, i must wait in violation of this belief until another moment at which time my will is ripe, or open to the belief again. it is as if i have leapt off the ice patch which endorsed the belief, only to wait again until a moment has arrived when i have returned to it; to hold a belief constantly over a considerable time is (in my analogy) to sink, to resist the will, or, to self-deceive, and imagine on that ice patch another bed of ice the boundaries of which are infinite.
taking this analogy further: the believer concocts a nearly endless array of crumbling ice-patches and solid beds of ice, oscillating according to the immediate whim of his mind, so that at times he is leaping through a pluralistic landscape (consciously) and at other times, he is walking firmly on a solid absolute conviction (consciously). it would be improper for me to discern that one reality is truer than the other, and in my use of the term ‘self-deception’ there is that implication, that, for example, the absolute conviction is a deception, and the notion that he is holding the conviction for a long duration, is a deception. perhaps to understand belief one must embrace the irrational without too much criticism. it becomes easier (for this thought experiment) to conceive a “true” reality, and a self-deceived layer of reality, but this is exactly what i want to avoid… this hierarchal assertion. these two seemingly irreconcilable realities may co-exist in the mind, as doublethink, as something in which the mind is able to conceive of, and through which the individual is able to accept without need of correction. one can believe in the absolute doctrine of christianity and pursue sinful activities without guilt, because of this dexterity of the mind. and i believe the oscillations between crumbling ice patches and solid beds of ice in a single hour of mental activity is staggering to conceive, were it not that we allow this to concur so much of the time without reproach.
how can i prove this? i certainly cannot prove it rationally, for this requires empirical evidence, the likes of which each person must uncover. i have in my own mind become aware of this pluralism, and presume it happens more times then i am able to consciously know. this is a conviction based on faith, not fact, nor reason.
the doublethink entries end here… as a result of new discoveries in the field of logical linguistics that have compelled me to revise my position somewhat… i still maintain the same general position, but i need to apply a different grammatical rigor to it, which i first have to master through my study of wittgenstein. so this is temporarily put on hold.