The Pagan Agenda

I have used the concepts ‘reason’ and ‘faith’ before and for the most part I have tried to keep their use confined to the realm of a thought experiment, because I believe they do not directly relate to the activities underlying these concepts as they manifest in life. Herein I will refer to ‘reason’ as a position, analagous to rationalism, which endorses certain articulated laws of argumentation (logical, analytical) for or against a particular belief. There is an extension of this position which maintains that aspects of human behavior are caused by a priori or acquired understanding of these rules of logic. In the case of a priori understanding it is argued that an articulated rule of logic triggers a correspondence with a hardwired recognition feature in the individual (either on a conscious or unconscious level); in the case of acquired understanding it is argued that the articulated rule of logic forms the basis for which a person remembers how to perform a task in the future. I contend that these conceptualizations of how reasoning occurs are fundamentally divergent from the phenomena they are meant to signify.

What is lacking is a demonstratable verification for either belief. I cannot on faith accept that intentionality is caused by a set of knowable hardwired or acquired rules of reason; for example, that how I am able to communicate with another person and be understood, or how I am able to open a door is causally linked to my consciously knowing a set of hardwired of learned rules of reason. The argument that the knowledge is unconsciously acquired a priori is not alone sufficient evidence that the articulated law of reason bears an essential relationship with human cognition (one could just as much argue that the content of an illogical claim is in some way authenticated by some mystical unconscious correspondence) . In the case where the articulated law of reason pertains to how people follow rules on a conscious level, I would argue that only in certain contexts is a conscious awareness of rule-playing relevant, for example in philosophical language games where we form our ideas into rational arguments susceptible to some agreed upon rules of engagement; however, in these cases the ‘rational principles’ are wholly conceptual, because by virtue of a thought experiment only certain criteria applies in the analysis, such criteria that depends on public language and articulated rational principles. For the large part of our participation in life we do not require this rigid scaffolding of logic to get by.

Wittgenstein uses the anecdote about a boy told to buy five red apples. Suppose in order to perform this task the boy had to refer to an index of information in his pocket pertaining to what “five” meant, and what “red” meant, and what “apples” meant. Is this analgous to how we know how to follow a command, do we go through an inventory in our minds, count up to five and then know what five means, or think about where red occurs in a colour wheel and then know what red means? Insofar as we are talking about what is consciously ascertained in the moment of rule following, it appears to have less to do with abiding by some articulated system of logic, as it has to do with grasping tacitly some meaning pertaining to the situation (or ‘language-game’ in Wittgenstein’s terminology).

I believe it is a fallacy to say that in any way beyond a ‘leap of faith’ one knows that some articulated rules of reason have a definitive causal role in our behaviour of ‘rule-following’, i.e. that reason has an essential quality. In this case the whole ‘reason-as-essence’ position is just one more leap, self-sustained within a category of terms that describes itself tautologically. If I am wrong then there should be a way to prove ( i.e. to know in verifiable terms) that , for example, inductive and deductive thinking occur in the human cognitive process. What happens instead is that inductive and deductive thinking are tautologically ‘proven’ by applying the rules of inductive and deductive thinking (see my analysis of induction here). Since so much of the weight of ‘reason-as-essence’ argument hinges upon the meaningfulness of these terms in describing actual cognitive processes, the contingent arguments are undermined.

Rather than support the reason-as-essence view, and in order to alternatively explain man’s capacity for rational behaviour, I propose that the articulated laws of reason have a causal influence over our behaviour of rule-following insofar as they as ‘concepts’ sway our beliefs. Beyond these instances I would argue our behaviour of rule-following occurs indifferent to knowable articulations of intent and instead in consequence of tacit comprehension via some manner of impulse or private sensation; therefore, I can open the door without thinking through any sort of rules for doing so, indeed without even needing to be thinking at all of the action at hand. What may appear to be evidence of reasoning (from an external view) may in fact be nothing more than a tacitly grasped hunch (a ‘leap’ as it were of articulated causes). These hunches may in fact be the shadows on the cave wall reflecting some real essential qualities but by virtue of our orientation in the cave (our epistomology) we cannot adequately explain in what manner they exist distinct from our propensity for grammatical misuses of language and fanciful imagination. To deduce or infer causal significance from the hunches is to derive interpretations which are self-perpetuating with more in common with myth-making than with demonstratable fact-discerning.

reason-as-essence requires a hierarchy, but under what authority can one argue for a hierarchy of hunches?

My own belief (and the one mentioned in the original thought experiment) is that the beliefs which occur most consistently have a natural advanatage over those that do not. In a way this is reminiscent of Nietzsche’s strange biological view of the ‘Will to Power’, except my view lacks doctrinal content. I do not even have to hold this belief, the point is the consistent beliefs sort out the hierarchy through their consistency, rather than through my imposed doctrine. Certainly a doctrine can be held in my mind and persuade some beliefs to occur in a consistent fashion, and I am wary of this ‘fanaticism’, insofar as I can consciously dismantle belief-structures which hold to an absolute conviction.

To hold steadfast to the hierarchical significance of ‘reason’ (without evidence) as something which can enhance one’s religious conviction is Brody’s narrative, and the consistency of his beliefs will self-perpetuate this idea, and I consider that a valid path to choose, but at what point does this narrative become universalized in his telling of it? In the act of universalizing the belief, in making it an external force with hierarchical advantage over your beliefs, one relinquishes one’s potential to the idea.

I welcome any thoughts on the subject, and particularly any examples of where one can prove reason-as-essence as a causal force in our behaviour of rule-following. To reiterate, I have set up a dichotomy analagous to a hardware view (reason-as-essence) vs. a software view (reason-as-concept). I believe human intentionality bears no essential dependence on articulated rules of reason. I argue that as far as we can show, reason exists only as concept, and has influence over our behaviour in only this matter, so that the significance of reason-based assertions are subject to this limitation, a conceptual one, not an essential one. It is a crude analogy to then assume the concept pertains to the activity of the mind, because the concept is based solely on public language and the phenomena of cognition is based solely on private sensation: the two are not demonstrably isomorphic.

This argument owes largely to Wittgenstein’s private language analysis which I intend to describe in detail in a future post.